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President Recep Tayyip Erdo#an is once again calling for a ‘new, civilian
constitution’, although the previous round of far-reaching constitutional amendments
have only been in force for 2.5 years. On the one hand, his ruminations could
appear odd considering that, between 2002 and 2011, the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) enjoyed a majority large enough to change the constitution on its own,
yet refrained from drafting a new version. On the other hand, Erdo#an’s thrust to
constitutional change fits to a more general pattern.
Due to declining approval rates, the AKP is turning to well-proven populist strategies,
initiating debates on the constitution while referring positively to the inclusive
constitution of 1921. While they do not enjoy a constitution-changing majority in
Parliament, and indeed failed to organize one even when ruling with an absolute
majority until 2018, this inclusive claim is essential. Despite this rhetoric, the ruling
AKP is not interested in a new constitution at all, but rather in specific modifications
that will secure their own power.
Constitutional debates in the AKP era
Throughout Turkey’s post-Ottoman history, a total of four constitutions (1921, 1924,
1961 and 1982) have been drafted. Each has undergone numerous and extensive
changes. Indeed, constitutional issues are not only recurrently salient in Turkey, but
also frequently a subject of election campaign promises. Thus, it is not surprising
that, roughly two years before the next elections, the President of the Turkish
Republic states that “Turkey is in need of a new constitution”.
At the same time, the ruling AKP could be seen as calling into question its own
constitutional amendments of 2018. While contradictory at first glance, this hardly
represents a novelty, but rather one of the constants in the AKP era. Already in
2003, the ruling party raised the idea of drafting a new constitution, when the then
prime minister, Erdo#an, pondered about introducing a ‘presidential system’ along
the lines of the United States. In 2011, a parliamentary committee on constitutional
consensus was built specifically for this purpose, but was dissolved just two years
later due to dissent among its members. Ironically, back then, the three opposition
parties reached a consensus on a rationalized parliamentary system. In turn, the
AKP stuck to its version of a ‘presidential system’, which they envisaged as a system
characterized by a one-person executive and vested with wide-ranging powers.
Although the term ‘presidentialism’ is commonly used, it is misleading, since
presidentialism presupposes an independence of both legislative and executive
branches. Since the Turkish Parliament and the popularly elected President
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each have the right to call early elections for both bodies, – similar to the short-
lived ‘parliadentialism’ in Israel between 1996 and 2002 – the feature of mutual
independence clearly does not apply. This unusual form of government is closer
to a parliamentary than a presidential system, which is why we should speak of
‘parliamentarism alla Turca’ instead of ‘presidentialism alla Turca’.
References to the constitution of 1921
During the current debate, some AKP politicians have recalled the first post-Ottoman
constitution of 1921 as role model. With only 24 articles, it was quite compact
but – compared to other Turkish constitutions – its drafting process largely met
democratic requirements. In comparative terms, the 1921 constitution is considered
a rare example of parliamentary absolutism, since an executive was explicitly not
envisaged. Moreover, it was the only Turkish constitution to date to limit the central
state and instead endow local governments with extensive authority. At this point,
it is rather unlikely that AKP will seriously use this predecessor as a guideline for a
new constitution. After all, this would – at least on paper – strengthen the legislature,
whereas the last constitutional revisions diminished the legislature to an organ
with no systemic relevance at all. Likewise, the outlook for a decentralized state
would not be compatible with the Turkish raison d’état and in particular with AKP’s
ideology, which, in the spirit of Carl Schmitt, seeks to centralize the state in order to
concentrate power.
There is therefore good reason to question why the constitution of 1921 is being
brought into the picture. As a constitution emerging in the turmoil of the so-called
Turkish War of Independence, and competing with the Ottoman constitution which
remained in force, it needed to be equally appealing to a variety of political actors:
First, followers of the Islamic monarchy were embraced as no head of state was
envisioned and thus the republican character was concealed; neither the sultanate
nor the caliphate were overtly challenged. Secondly, the provisions on decentralized
self-administration raised hopes among regional groups and minorities of transferring
the newly gained autonomy into the new order. Thirdly, opponents of the monarchy
were convinced by the notion of popular sovereignty being safeguarded in the hands
of the parliament. In this sense, the 1921 constitution appealed to many groups.
While the AKP constantly invokes the image of a ‘new, civilian constitution’, this
inclusive claim is at odds with the reality of its recent constitutional amendments.
Although the constitutional amendments enacted in 2018 are not a straight result of
military intervention, the parliamentary ballot and constitutional referendum occurred
under a highly illiberal state of emergency. There is a clear gap between rhetoric and
practice, which leads to the assumption that the inclusive approach AKP purported to
have taken was pure populism.
Strengthening the ‘parliamentarism alla Turca’
Thus, what is the purpose of the demands for a new constitution? Based on previous
government practice, the likelihood of a new constitution satisfying civil, liberal
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and democratic demands is highly doubtful. A major transformation of the form of
government is also hardly to be expected, as the President already stated. Likewise,
there is not much reason to hope for a democratization of the current constitution.
Most likely, the agenda will focus on further reinforcing the president’s position within
the authoritarian ‘parliamentarism alla turca’, which may take several expressions:
1. The removal of presidential term limits. The current rule stipulates that the head
of state can be re-elected only once and (Article 101), under extraordinary
circumstances, a third time.
2. In the past, there has long been a discussion about lowering the requisite
majority to appoint the head of state from an absolute to a relative majority (also
Article 101). Such reduction would increase the odds of re-election.
3. The remaining (minor) restrictions on executive decrees (Article 104) that have
the binding effect of law and on budgetary provisions could be removed, thus
giving the president more room for maneuvering.
4. Additionally, the removal of the parliamentary vote of no confidence in order
to oppose the persistent threat of being voted out of office is also conceivable.
Although a required three-fifths majority (Article 116) initially sounds like a high
threshold, it is even more likely to be realized than a constructive vote of no
confidence, since the former is a destructive political majority and only need be
united to remove the president.
5. Aside from horizontal separation of powers, measures restricting other
fundamental rights and freedoms are thinkable. This would be in line with AKP’s
recent authoritarian approach against the opposition, exemplified in the way the
HDP has been dealt with.
What all these speculative ‘reforms’ have in common is that they are intended to
strengthen the president in office and to counteract a situational dependence on the
MHP in the course of presidential and parliamentary elections. After all, the society
is deeply divided, reflected not least in the last municipal elections in which AKP
suffered major losses in crucial cities. Thus, the ruling party is seeking constitutional
ways to maintain its own power, as it has lost much of its appeal in recent years. The
decline in support is especially prevalent among the youth – the voters of tomorrow –
which can be observed, for example, in the ongoing resistance of Bo#aziçi University
students against a rector appointed by the government.
Conclusion
In the end, both the call for a ‘new, civilian constitution’ and the asserted role
model of the 1921 constitution are part of the AKP’s rhetorical-populist repertoire:
Complaining about the ‘rules of the game’, even though the AKP itself has been
setting them for almost two decades. Once again, the Turkish public is witnessing
a pseudo-discussion on a trumped-up urgency of a new constitution, conducted
strategically rather than honestly for the common benefit. The likelihood of an actual
implementation of a ‘new, civilian constitution’ is minimal, while the government’s
efforts are motivated by the self-preservation of its power, thus making another
authoritarian shift probable.
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Currently, the proponents of a constitutional amendment, the AKP and MHP,
lack a majority in order to reach the required quorum of at least 360 seats for a
referendum. For that purpose, they are seeking cooperation with the IYI-party, which
is a splinter of the MHP. A first rapprochement may already be observed: All three
parliamentary groups could be engaged in negotiations on a party ban against the
HDP. Consequently, the posturing around a ‘new, civilian constitution’ spells a highly
disconcerting outlook for the few remaining democratic forces in Turkey.
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